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A "FAMILIAR" STANDARD OF CARE: WHAT THE SAME OR
SIMILAR COMMUNITIES STANDARD COULD MEAN FOR
MARYLAND.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Picture yourself as a doctor with years of training and experience,
treating a patient. You discuss with your patient the risks and
benefits of a test you could perform that would screen for a disease.
The patient refuses, and you do not order the test. You later find out
that the patient has this disease when a medical malpractice claim is
brought against you. In states that use a "locality rule" for medical
malpractice cases, if the standard practice in that area was to order
the test without asking the patient, you could be held liable for a
failure to meet the standard of care even if your decision was the
most prudent by national standards.'
Imagine instead, the more likely scenario, that you are a patient.
You begin to experience what you believe to be adverse effects of a
procedure you underwent at a hospital, so you do some research.
You find that the procedure is no longer practiced in most hospitals
across the country because of the same effects you are experiencing.
You bring a medical malpractice claim against your health care
provider and retain an expert witness who will testify that ordering
the procedure violated the national standard of care. In a locality rule
state, you will likely be uncompensated ifthe procedure is commonly
ordered in your health care provider's medical community. In fact,
your expert's testimony will probably be excluded for failing to
address the relevant standard of care. 2
Maryland has wisely operated under the national standard of care
since 1975. 3 In 1993, the Maryland General Assembly passed House
Bill 1359, which was intended to reform the small group health
insurance market. 4 A provision in this bill, dealing with the legal
1.

2.
3.
4.

See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Liability by Locality: Practical Standard or Outdated Notion?,
AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/ZOlO/01l18
/prsaOI18.htm. Physician Daniel J. Merenstein, MD, was involved in such a case.
See id.
See infra Part II.C.l.
See infra Part III.B.
See Maria S. LoBianco et aI., A Model for Case Management of High Cost Medicaid
Users, NURSING ECON., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 303-07, 314, available at http://
findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_mOFSW/is _ nS_ v 14/ai_n 18607072/.
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standard of care for medical malpractice cases in Maryland, was
added with little-to-no discussion, and went unnoticed by many. 5
The provision added new language to the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, stating that health care
providers would only be held to the standard of care in the "same or
similar communities" as that of the health care provider. 6 While this
language was added in 1993, its meaning and effect are still in debate
because it is in direct conflict with Maryland's national standard,
previously established by common law. 7 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland recently addressed this issue and provided its
guidance as to how the statute should be applied. 8
This comment will focus on the effect the "same or similar
communities" language in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article9 will have on the standard of care in medical malpractice
cases in Maryland. Part II provides background on how the standard
of care operates,IO describes the three different types of standards, II
and explains why it is critical for the legal standard of care to be
The
clearly defined for both plaintiffs 12 and physicians. 13
consequences of an unclear standard for plaintiffs will be illustrated
using North Carolina's application of a same or similar communities
standard and examining the problems that have arisen there. 14 Part III
chronicles the evolution of Maryland's standard of care jurisprudence
from common law before 1975,15 to the recent Court of Special
Appeals decision in Daee v. Lucas. 16 Part IV details the possible
decisions the Court of Appeals of Maryland could make as to the
standard of care issue,17 and ends by imploring the court that if it
insists on applying a same or similar communities rule for Maryland,
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Dan J. Loden, Community Standard in Health Law May Burden Malpractice
Plaintiffs, THE DAILY RECORD, Sept. 18, 1993, at 11 (noting that the legislation was
likely pushed by lobbyists for the insurance industry). The bill was primarily focused
on health insurance issues, not medical malpractice law. See LoBianco et aI., supra
note 4.
1993 Md. Laws 529, 546.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See discussion of Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011) infra
Part IILE.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(I) (LexisNexis 2011).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part lLD.
See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part lILA.
See infra Part IILE.
See infra Part IV.A.
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it should establish clear guidelines for applying the standard as soon
as possible in order to avoid problems exemplified by North
Carolina. 18
II.

IMPORTANCE OF A CLEAR STANDARD OF CARE

A.

The Expert Testimony Requirement

To understand the effect that the legal standard of care for medical
malpractice has, it is first necessary to grasp the interplay between the
standard of care and the expert testimony requirement. To establish a
prima facie case of medical malpractice, Maryland law requires that a
plaintiff plead and prove through expert testimony, the standard of
care applicable to the defendant health care provider, that the health
care provider deviated from the standard of care, that the deviation
was a cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that damages resulted from
that injury.19 Expert medical testimony under Maryland law must be
based on a "reasonable degree of medical probability.,,20 In order for
a medical expert to produce such testimony, the expert must be
familiar with the standard of care. 21 The law governing the standard
of care determines what standard the expert must be familiar with
and, therefore, who is eligible to give the expert testimony medical
malpractice plaintiffs must provide.

B.

The Three Standards of Care

1.

Strict Locality

The "strict locality" standard is the most onerous of the three
standards of care. 22 In Maryland, it was first described as "whether or
not [the physician] did fail to exercise the amount of care, skill and
diligence as a physician and surgeon which is exercised generally in
the community ... in which he was practi[c]ing by doctors engaged
in the same field.,,23 Under the strict locality rule, plaintiffs must
provide testimony from an expert familiar with the standard of care
specific to the defendant physician's community, which usually
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

See infra Part IV.B.
Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39, 71, 926 A.2d 736,755 (2007).
Kearney v. Berger, 416 Md. 628, 651, 7 A.3d 593, 606 (2010) (quoting Carroll v.
Konits, 400 Md. 167,211,929 A.2d 19,45 (2007) (Greene, J., dissenting)).
Seeid. at 651-52, 7 A.3dat606.
Marvin Ellin, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Maryland: A Plaintiffs Dilemma, 3
U. BALT. L. REv. 207,208 (1973).
State ex reI. Solomon v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 195, 179 A.2d 349, 352 (1962).
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requires the expert to practice in the same community as the
defendant. 24 The rationale behind this rule is that a physician who
has practiced in a medical community similar to that of the defendant
physician with the same standard of care might still lack the requisite
familiarity with the applicable standard to qualify as an expert. 25
2.

Similar Locality

The "similar locality" rule is slightly more relaxed than the strict
locality rule. 26 This standard was enunciated by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Small v. Howard as requiring "that skill
only which physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability and skill,
practi[ c]ing in similar localities, with opportunities for no larger
experience, ordinarily possess.,,27 Rather than requiring expert
testimony as to the standard of care in the specific locality in which
the defendant physician practices, testimony about a similar locality
is permissible. 28 For instance, under this rule, a doctor familiar with
the standard of care in a small, rural town in Maryland could provide
expert testimony against a practitioner in a small, rural town in
Massachusetts. 29
3.

National Standard

The "national standard" eliminates familiarity with any particular
location from the analysis. 30 This standard was described by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland as the "duty to use that degree of care
and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in
the same class to which [the defendant] belongs, acting in the same or
similar circumstances," taking into account "advances in the
profession, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice,
proximity of specialists and special facilities, [and] all other relevant
considerations.,,3l A doctor familiar with the national standard of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

3!.

See Ellin, supra note 22, at 208.
See id.
See id. at 216.
Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880), overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 235
N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 195-96, 349 A.2d
245,249-50 (1975).
See Ellin, supra note 22, at 216.
See Kobialko v. Lopez, 576 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("[A] doctor
familiar with the national, uniform standards... is considered sufficiently
knowledgeable of all localities." (citing Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ill.
1986))).
Shilkret, 276 Md. at 200-01,349 A.2d at 253.
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care can testify under this rule without any familiarity with the
defendant physician's community or a similar community.32
C.

The Standard of Care Must Be Clear for Plaintiffs

1.

Failing to Establish the Standard of Care

A plaintiffs failure to establish the applicable standard of care
will be fatal to a case of medical malpractice. 33 The strict locality
rule, being the most onerous standard, provides an illustration. In
Dunham v. Elder, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland34 held
that a urologist who had never practiced in any capacity in the state
was not qualified to provide expert testimony as to the standard of
care under the strict locality rule. 35 The plaintiffs provided a second
witness who had not practiced in Maryland either and on that basis he
did not qualify as an expert at trial. 36 Testifying as an "examining
physician," the second witness stated that the standard of care in the
defendant physician's specialty was that of a general practitioner, but
did not testify as to what that standard would entail. 37 The court ruled
that the plaintiffs did not make a prima facie case of medical
malpractice because, without a qualified expert, the "testimony was
insufficient to establish what was the standard of medical care and
skill required... in Prince George's County," the defendant
physician's medical community.38 Where the strict locality rule
demands the exclusion of a critical expert witness, the plaintiff will
lose the case, as in this example.
Because the standard of care controls who may provide expert
testimony, it also controls whom parties in a medical malpractice
case select as their experts. In order for plaintiffs to provide an
expert qualified to testify as to the standard of care, the requirements
for qualifying that expert to the court must be known. Uncertainties
about the law can cause this selection to be difficult and stressful
because a plaintiff s claim is at risk.

32.
33.
34.
35..
36.
37.
38.

See Kobialko, 576 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing Purtill, 489 N.E.2d at 874).
See, e.g., Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 366-67, 306 A.2d 568, 572 (1973).
Note, though, that Maryland no longer applies this standard. See infra Part III.
Elder, 18 Md. App. at 365, 306 A.2d at 571. The witness was permitted to testify as
an expert in urology, but not to the applicable standard. Id.
Id. at 366, 306 A.2d at 572.
Id.
ld. at 366-67, 306 A.2d at 572.
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North Carolina's Problems with an Unclear Standard

Locality rules demand an extra requirement of proving an expert's
familiarity with the defendant physician's community or a similar
community. 39 North Carolina applies such a standard, but the
familiarity requirements under North Carolina law are uncertain. 40
North Carolina's experience illustrates the importance of clarifying
the familiarity requirements to ensure plaintiffs have a fair shot at
acquiring adequate expert testimony.
North Carolina abandoned the strict locality rule for a same or
similar communities standard at common law,41 and subsequently
codified that rule by statute in 1975.42 The North Carolina General
Assembly's report on that statute indicated that it specifically adopted
a same or similar communities standard of care to avoid further
interpretation by the state's high court that "might lead to regional or
national standards for all health care providers.,,43

a.

The "familiarity" requirement

Two North Carolina decisions caused much confusion as to the
degree of familiarity an expert witness must have in order to testify to
the standard of care in the same or similar community as the
defendant physician. In Henry v. Southeastern OB-GYN Associates,
the plaintiffs expert was excluded because he was found to be
unfamiliar with the medical community in Wilmington, North
Carolina, the community in which the defendant physician
39.
40.

41.

42.

See id. at 363-64,306 A.2d at 570-71.
See Casey Hyman, Comment, Setting the "Bar" in North Carolina Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care that Everyone Loves to
Hate, 89 N.C. L. REv. 234, 236 (2010).
See Wiggins v. Piver, 171 S.E.2d 393,397-98 (N.C. 1970).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.12 (West 2010).
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out
of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in
the performance of medical, dental, or other health care, the
defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless
the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the
evidence that the care of such health care provider was not in
accordance with the standards of practice among members of the
same health care profession with similar training and experience
situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the
alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.

Id.
43.

Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 550 S.E.2d 245, 246 (N.c. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
N.C. PROF'L LIAB. INS. STUDY COMM'N, REpORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1976,
at 32 (1976)), affd per curiam, 557 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 2001).
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practiced. 44 Plaintiffs argued that the standard of care in the
defendant's community was a national standard, and because their
expert could testify as to the national standard of care, it was error to
exclude his testimony.45 Plaintiffs also argued that their expert was
familiar with the standard of care in Spartanburg, South Carolina,
which would be the same standard applied in Durham and Chapel
Hill, North Carolina. 46
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina rejected both arguments,
stating that there was no evidence that the national standard of care
was practiced in the defendant's community, that the standard in
Durham or Chapel Hill was the standard practiced in the defendant's
community, or that Durham or Chapel Hill were similar communities
to Wilmington. 47 The court noted that it had "recognized very few
'uniform procedures' to which a national standard may apply, and to
which an expert may testify.,,48 The court relied on the intent behind
the General Assembly's adoption of the similar community rule "'to
avoid the adoption of a national or regional standard of care for
health providers. ",49 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
this decision per curiam, providing no guidance as to what level of
familiarity may have been sufficient. 50
Four years later, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
the lower appellate court's decision in Pitts v. Nash Day Hospital,
Inc.,s' which held that a medical expert was sufficiently familiar with
the same or similar medical community as the defendant. 52 As in
Henry, the expert testified that the applicable standard of care was a
national standard. 53 However, the court looked to the expert's
testimony as a whole, and held that he met the familiarity
requirement by testifying that he was similarly trained as the
defendant physician, practiced in multiple communities inside North
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 247 (citing Haney v. Alexander, 323 S.E.2d 430, 434 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(nurses taking and reporting vital signs); Page v. Wilson Mem'l Hosp., 272 S.E.2d 8,
10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (nursing practices associated with bedpan use».
Id. at 246 (quoting Page, 272 S.E.2d at 10), aff'd per curiam, 557 S.E.2d 530 (N.C.
2001).
Id. at 530.
Pitts v. Nash Day Hosp., 605 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), affd per curiam, 614
S.E.2d 267 (N.C. 2005).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
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Carolina like the defendant, and that the "facilities, equipment,
funding, and the physical and financial environment of both the
communities in which [the expert] practiced" and in the community
in which the defendant practiced were similar. 54 The court also found
that the expert had practiced in communities with "population[ s] and
median income[s]" similar to the defendant's medical community,
relating them as to "population served, rural nature, depressed
Lastly, before the
economy, and limitations on resources.,,55
proffered expert testified, he had "observed the community [in which
the defendant practiced and] noted the size of [the defendant's
hospital].,,56 The court therefore held that the proffered expert was
sufficiently familiar with the community's standard to meet the
expert witness qualifications of North Carolina's same or similar
communities standard, but again defined no evidentiary standard that
the expert had met. 57
From the Henry and Pitts decisions, it is difficult to ascertain the
requirements for establishing an expert's familiarity with the
defendant physician's community under the same or similar
communities standard. These cases perhaps did just as much to
confuse the requirements as to clarify them for North Carolina. 58
b.

Maintaining "flexibility"

The Supreme Court of North Carolina had its chance to clarify the
state's standard of care requirements when it was handed two more
cases with expert familiarity at issue: 0 'Mara v. Wake Forest
University Health Sciences 59 and Crocker v. Roethling. 60 The court,
however, passed again on an opportunity to set clear guidelines for
establishing an expert witness's familiarity with the same or similar
communities as the defendant physician. 61
The Supreme Court of North Carolina determined the review of
O'Mara was improvidently allowed and therefore did not decide on
the case. 62 The court's decision in Crocker added just as little clarity.
In Crocker, the trial court excluded the plaintiffs expert because his
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 199.
See Hyman, supra note 40, at 236.
646 S.E.2d 400 (N.c. Ct. App. 2007), disc. review improvidently allowed by 678
S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 2009).
646 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), rev'd, 675 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 2009).
Hyman, supra note 40, at 237.
678 S.E.2d at 658.
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affidavit lacked evidence that he was familiar with the standard of
care in the same or similar community as the defendant. 63 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a "trial court may not
automatically disqualify an expert witness simply because the witness
indicates reliance on a national standard of care during a discovery
deposition.,,64 The court stated that while the plaintiff does have a
duty to establish the witness's familiarity with the same or similar
communities in which the defendant practiced, it does not have to be
done at the discovery deposition stage. 65
The expert's sworn affidavit stated that he had "reviewed
information" about care in the defendant physician's community, the
defendant, and the defendant's practice. 66 The affidavit also stated
plainly that the expert was familiar with the relevant standard of care
in the defendant's community at the time of the alleged malpractice. 67
The Crocker court stated that there was no requirement under North
Carolina law for the expert to provide "documentation of his research
or attempt to explain to the trial judge how his knowledge about the
community enabled him to ascertain the relevant standard of care.,,68
However, the only guidance provided by the court, as to fulfilling the
familiarity requirement, is a recommendation that "the trial court [s]
should apply well-established principles of determining relevancy
under Evidence Rules 40 I and 70 I ,,69 and that, because the court
desires to "preserve flexibility," many methods of becoming familiar
with a given community are possible. 70
The court continues to adhere to this non-standard, which has
prompted the following riddle: "When is a board certified doctor with
20 years of directly related surgical experience not qualified to testify
as a surgical expert on the standard of care in a medical malpractice
case? When he or she is asked to testify in a North Carolina
courtroom.,,7! Unclear standards like those in North Carolina create
an unfair situation for plaintiffs who could have their case thrown out
if they fail to meet arbitrary familiarity requirements.
63.
64.

65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

675 S.E.2d at 627.
Jd. at 631.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd. at 632.
Jd. at 631.
Mark Canepa, Making Your Way Through the Minefield of Expert Witness Selection
in Malpractice Cases in North Carolina, 10 N.C. STATE BAR J. 6, 6 (2005), available
at http://www.ncbar.comljournaVarchive/Journal%20 10,4 .pdf.
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The Standard of Care Must Be Clear for Physicians

The uncertainty surrounding the standard of care requirements is
arguably even more stressful for doctors because the critical
decisions they make, based on what they believe to be the applicable
standard of care, could be the focus of a medical malpractice claim. 72
The standard of care must be understood so that doctors know what
level of care is legally required. 73 Doctors practicing medicine in
Maryland deserve to know the standard of care they must meet in
their day-to-day professional life if they are going to be held
responsible for not meeting it. 74 Doctors that intend to testify as
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases also need to know what
standard applies if they are going to provide an opinion, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, on whether a doctor
breached the required standard. 7s
In a June 2007 article written by three doctors, at least two of
whom studied medicine in the Maryland area, the authors argue that
"adherence to the locality rule can create uncertainty for physicians
when they must choose between following local practice standards
and national, evidence-based standards of care.,,76 The article
advocates a national standard of care to ensure the standard is clear,
stating that location should only be taken into account when
considering access to facilities or specialists, not the knowledge or
skill expected from the physician. 77 Considerations of such factors
can be accomplished under the national standard without a locality
rule. 78

72.
73.

74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

See Sorrel, supra note l.
See Michelle Huckaby Lewis et ai., The Locality Rule and the Physician's Dilemma:
Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297 lAMA 2633, 2633
(2007) [hereinafter Physician's Dilemma].
Id.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Doctors have come under attack by
disciplinary boards for allegedly misstating the standard of care. See generally
Maureen Glabman, Scared Silent: The Clash Between Malpractice Lawsuits & Expert
Testimony, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, (July-Aug. 2003), available at http://
findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_ m0843/is_4_29/ai_l 055426 17I?tag=content;col 1
(describing how neurosurgeon Dr. Gary Lustgarten's medical license was threatened
with revocation by the North Carolina Medical Board for expert testimony he
provided for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case).
Physician's Dilemma, supra note 73, at 2633. Note, though, that the authors are
speaking generally, not just about Maryland.
Id. at 2636.
Maryland's national standard considers such factors. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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Michael D. Frakes, a Harvard Law School graduate, has analyzed
whether changes in the legal standard of care have affected physician
behavior in states moving from a locality rule standard to a national
standard. 79 Using cesarean section utilization as a model, the author
found a significant convergence toward national trends once a
national standard of care is adopted. 80 This shows that at least some
facets of physician behavior are controlled by the legal standard of
care, 8 I and that an ultimate decision on the standard of care in
Maryland might truly affect the care that patients receive from their
doctors.
III. EVOLUTION OF MARYLAND'S STANDARD OF CARE
A.

Maryland's Common Law Before 1975

Prior to 1975, to establish the standard of care for medical
malpractice in Maryland, parties were bound by a strict locality
rule. 82 In Dunham v. Elder, the court stated that Maryland precedent
called for the application of the strict locality rule, but seemed
hesitant, noting that the rule was a minority view, which most
jurisdictions shied away from. 83 The Court of Appeals in Raitt v.
Johns Hopkins Hospital addressed the Dunham court's concerns, and
held that even under a strict locality rule, excluding any proffered
witness who had not practiced in Maryland was improper because
that was only one factor in the inquiry. 84
B.

Maryland's 1975 Shilkret Decision

1.

Abandonment of the Strict Locality Rule

In 1975, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reexamined the strict
locality rule in Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital
79.

80.
81.
8Z.
83.

84.

Michael D. Frakes, Essays on Malpractice Law and Physician Behavior, 18 (June
Z009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
available at http://dspace.mit.edulbitstreamlhandle/l721.1/49706/436449488.pdf?
sequence= I.
Jd. at 57-58.
See id.
Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 364, 306 A.Zd 568, 571 (1973).
Jd. at 364-65, 306 A.Zd at 571. However, the court said that the plaintiff had not
provided sufficient evidence as to any standard of care, so the issue of what the
standard of care should be in Maryland was not before the court. Jd. at 366, 306 A.Zd
at 571. The Court of Special Appeals decided Dunham just two years before
Maryland would adopt a national standard of care. See infra Part lI.B.3.
Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 274 Md. 489, 500-01, 336 A.2d 90, 96 (1975).
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Association. 85 The court stated that the strict locality rule was created
to protect physicians in remote rural areas from being held to the
same standard as physicians in urban areas who have better access to
modem medical research, medical techniques, and facilities. 86 Such a
rule had become less necessary with the "national accrediting
system[,] which ha[ d] contributed to the standardization of medical
schools throughout the country," and advances in communication
(essentially equal access for all physicians to resources). 87 According
to the court, the rule had amounted to collusion, a "'conspiracy of
silence,''' among local practitioners. 88 Because many doctors refused
to provide expert testimony against doctors they knew, and because
plaintiffs were required to use doctors from the same locality as the
defendant physicians for their expert witnesses, plaintiffs could
almost never have a successful case. 89 Also problematic were
situations in which a sole practitioner, the only physician In a
locality, could effectually define their own standard of care. 90

2.

Rejection of the Similar Locality Rule

The Shilkret court then considered the similar locality rule. 91 The
court stated that this standard can answer some of the problems
associated with the strict locality rule (such as collusion and sole
practitioner problems), 92 but it did not "effectively alleviate the other
potential problem, a low standard of care in some of the smaller
communities, because the standard in similar communities is apt to
be the same.,,93 The court also identified the additional difficulty in
defining what communities are similar. 94 While the court noted that
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

276 Md. 187,349 A.2d 245 (1975).
Jd. at 193,349 A.2d at 248.

Id. at 194,349 A.2d at 249.
Id. (quoting Case Note, Michigan Abandons "Locality Rule" with Regard to
Specialists, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 435, 438 (1971}).
Id.
[The] strict locality standard could create a harsh result-the
possibility that a plaintiff might be left without a remedy in a
locality which had only one physician, in a locality where all
physicians were below the standards generally set for rural
communities or where a "conspiracy of silence" in the plaintiff's
locality eliminated the possibility of securing expert testimony.
Case Note, supra note 88, at 438 (footnote omitted).
Shilkret, 276 Md. at 193-94,349 A.2d at 249.
Id. at 195-96,349 A.2d at 250.
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
Shilkret, 276 Md. at 196, 349 A.2d at 250.
Id.
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some states had moved to a similar community standard, the court
expressly rejected its adoption for Maryland. 95
3.

Adoption of the National Standard of Care

Lastly, the court discussed the national standard of care. 96 The
court stated that a national standard of care was well justified, noted
the superiority of accredited medical institutions compared to medical
schools of the past, and stated:
[V]astly superior postgraduate training, the dynamic impact
of modem communications and transportation, the
proliferation of medical literature, frequent seminars and
conferences on a variety of professional subjects, and the
growing availability of modem clinical facilities are but
some of the developments in the medical profession which
combine to produce contemporary standards that are not
only much higher than they were just a few short years ago,
but also are national in scope. 97
The court ultimately decided to abandon locality rules in favor of a
national standard of care in Maryland. 98 Therefore, a physician from
any locality who was familiar with the national standard of care could
provide expert testimony in a Maryland medical malpractice case. 99
C.

Maryland's 1993 Enactment of§ 3-2A-02(c)

Eighteen years later in 1993, while the Shilkret national standard
was still the law of Maryland, the Maryland General Assembly
inserted § 3-2A-02(c)100 into the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Maryland Code (now section 3-2A-02(c)(I)) through
the enactment of House Bill 1359, which read as follows:
In any action for damages filed under this subtitle, the
health care provider is not liable for the payment of
damages unless it is established that the care given by the
health care provider is not in accordance with the standards
of practice among members of the same health care
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 198-99,349 A.2d at 251-52.
Id. at 199-200, 349 A.2d at 252-53.
Id. at 199,349 A.2d at 252.
Id. at 199-200, 349 A.3d at 252-53.
Id. at 200, 349 A.2d at 252-53.
1993 Md. Laws 529, 546.
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profession with similar training and experience situated in
the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged
act giving rise to the cause of action. 101
The legislation could be argued as an abandonment of Maryland's
national standard for a similar locality rule (like that discussed in
Shilkret), but the statute has not been acknowledged as a change by
the Court of Appeals. 102 When interpreting the statute, it is presumed
that the legislature knew the law, and therefore, by using language
that annunciates an entirely different standard of care, must have
intended to alter the standard. 103
In construing a statute, [the court will] look first to the plain
language of the statute, and if that language is clear and
unambiguous, [the court will] look no further than the text of the
statute. A plain reading of the statute assumes none of its
language is superfluous or nugatory. 104

The phrase "same or similar communities" does not appear to be
ambiguous. The preceding language indicates that it is an evidentiary
issue: "[T]he health care provider is not liable... unless it is
established that the care given... is not in accordance with the
standards of practice among members. .. situated in the same or
similar communities .... ,,105
The next step to determine legislative intent is to look at the
statute as a whole, the prior case law, and the legislative history. 106
Unfortunately, the legislative history is essentially nonexistent. 107
The only information available is that the Conference Committee
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See Terry L. Trimble, Recent Development, Delegates Deliver a Deathblow to
Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration System, 55 MD. L. REv. 893, 899 (1996).
103. In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) ("The
cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative
intent. . .. The General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to,
full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the
subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law.")
104. Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 349-50, 958 A.2d 356,361 (2008) (citation omitted.
105. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(1) (2011).
106. Newell, 407 Md. at 641, 967 A.2d at 766. Even if a statute seems clear, an inquiry
does not have to stop with the plain language of a statute, and other persuasive
material may be taken into account for its interpretation. Kaczorowski v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505,514-15,525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
107. See Loden, supra note 5, noting that the "provision was inserted at the last minute,
without adequate testimony, and has not been discussed in the media or understood by
the public."
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rejected the Senate Amendments to House Bill 1359 and adopted the
Conference Committee Amendments, which included § 3-2A-02(c)
as Amendment No.4. \08 The same or similar communities language
is not used elsewhere in the statute. This provides no evidence of the
legislature's intent other than that the language was only to apply to §
3-2A-02(c) entitled, "Establishing liability of health care provider;
qualifications of persons testifying. ,,109 These sources provide
meager guidance as to the legislature's intent, and the case law
following the statute's enactment IS no more helpful for
interpretation. I 10
D. Maryland's Standard oJ Care Jurisprudence 1993-2011
Since the same or similar communities language was inserted into
the Maryland Code in 1993, the Court of Appeals has cited both
Shilkret and § 3-2A-02(c) as authority for the standard of care in
Maryland, but has never addressed whether the statute modifies the
The Court of Appeals of
standard announced in Shilkret. lll
Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit all have cited § 3-2A-02(c)(1)
and used the statutory language, "same or similar communities,"
when describing the standard of care in Maryland. I 12 However, since
the court's adoption of the national standard of care in 1975, Shilkret
has been cited in almost every medical malpractice decision reported
in Maryland, and has never been overruled by the Court of
Appeals. l13

108. See 1993 Md. Laws 529, 546. Included among the legislative history, available on
microfilm at the Maryland State Law Library, is an article by Dan J. Loden, originally
from the "Law Watch" section of THE MARYLAND LAWYER dated Saturday,
September 18, 1993, concerning the same or similar communities provision. See
Loden, supra note 5. Also included is a photocopy of North Carolina's same or
similar communities standard codified in North Carolina's General Statutes § 9021.12. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
109. CTS.&JUD.PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(2011).
110. The effect of the "same or similar communities" language was not addressed until
Daee v. Lucas, discussed infra Part IILE.
Ill. Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485, slip op. at 14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011).
112. Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp, Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 1978); Dingle v. Belin,
358 Md. 354, 368, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (2000); Wa1dt v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
181 Md. App. 217, 243, 956 A.2d 223, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
113. See Trimble, supra note 102, at 899 & n.50.
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There are approximately 600 medical malpractice claims filed
every year in Maryland,114 but not one appellate decision has even
suggested that the Shilkret standard had been abandoned. 115 In
Dingle v. Belin,116 the Court of Appeals cited the Shilkret standard
directly before using the statutory language of § 3-2A-02(c)(1), and
did not indicate that the statutory language meant anything different
than the Shilkret standard. 117 The case law is therefore unhelpful for
interpreting the statute.
E.

Maryland's 2011 Daee Decision

Although the courts have cited both Shilkret and § 3-2A-02(c) as
authority for the standard, there are no reported cases in which an
expert's qualifications have been challenged based on the statutory
same or similar communities language. 118 A Maryland appellate
court has only recently addressed the issue.
1.

The Trial

In Daee v. Lucas, a wrongful death action ansmg out of the
treatment of a gunshot injury, plaintiffs offered two expert witnesses
at trial. 119 Plaintiffs established their first expert's education, training,
and experience as a surgeon through voir dire. 120 Defense counsel,
after conducting their own voir dire, objected to the witness "being
See FRANK CLEMENTE & NEAL PATTISON, PUB. CITIZEN'S CONGo WATCH, THE FACTS
ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MARYLAND II fig. 2 (2004), available at
http://www.citizen. orgidocumentslMaryland_MedMal_Report_2004.pdf.
115. See Trimble, supra note 102, at 899 & n.50.
116. 358 Md. 354, 749 A.2d 154.
117. Id. at 368. This section of Dingle reads:
The negligence consists of the breach of the duty that a physician
has "to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a
reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which [the
physician] belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances."
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 276 Md. 187, 200, 349
A.2d 245,252 (1975). To recover in such an action, the plaintiff
must show that the doctor's conduct-the care given or withheld by
the doctor-was not in accordance with the standards of practice
among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar
communities at the time of the act (or omission) giving rise to the
cause of action. See Maryland Code, § 3-2A-02(c) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Id. (alteration in original).
118. Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485, slip op. at 14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011).
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 6.

114.
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qualified as an expert on pancreatic surgeries and as a trauma
surgeon.,,121
The court overruled the objection, "noting that Dr. Daee's
objection went to the weight to be afforded [to the expert's]
testimony, not his qualifications.,,122 The expert witness then testified
to various breaches in the standard of care, without which, he
claimed, the doctor's patient would still be alive.123 He based his
opinions on what he said was "the known standard" that he knew
from his training. 124 The parties stipulated to the qualifications of the
second expert witness. 125
The defendant moved for judgment at the close of the plaintiffs'
case, arguing that the plaintiffs had not proven the standard of care in
the same or similar communities as the defendant physician. 126 This
motion was denied, renewed at the close of all the evidence, and
denied again. 127 The jury was instructed about the standard of care,
without objection by the defendant, according to Maryland Civil
Pattern Jury Instruction 27: I as follows: "A health care provider is
negligent if the health care provider does not use that degree of care
and skill which a reasonably competent health care provider, engaged
in a similar practice and acting in similar circumstances, would
use.,,128 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 129

2.

The Appeal

The Court of Special Appeals discussed the conflict between the
Shilkret standard and the statutory same or similar communities
language, and noted that "there are no reported cases ... challenging
an expert's qualifications to testify based on [the same or similar
communities] standard or explaining the manner of establishing that
this standard has been met.,,130 The court held that the statutory same
or similar communities requirement is a foundational requirement

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 6-7.
!d. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.at9-1O.
!d. at 10 (citing MD. CiVIL PlI 27:1 (Md. State Bar Ass'n, Inc. 2009».
!d. at 4.
Id. at 14.
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"satisfied through the voir dire qualification of the expert witnesses
who are called to testify about the standard of care.,,131
One reason the court provided for characterizing the statutory
language as a foundational requirement is the caption of § 3-2A02(c), which reads, "[e]stablishing liability of health care provider;
qualifications of persons testifying.,,132 The court also noted that
defense counsel had treated the issue as foundational by establishing
his own experts' familiarity with the standard of care in the same or
similar community as the defendant physician through voir dire
questioning. 133
The court found that the voir dire testimony in this case provided
sufficient evidence to qualify the plaintiffs' two expert witnesses. 134
The court then held that, because the defendant did not challenge the
experts on the basis that their "training, experience, and
knowledge ... did not pertain" to the same or similar community as
the defendant physician, that issue was waived for appellate
review. 135 The court also held that there is no obligation that an
admitted expert "opine specifically that [the defendant] deviated from
the standard of care practiced 'in the same or similar communities' as
[that of the defendant].,,136
IV. WHAT SHOULD MARYLAND DO?
The Court of Special Appeals in Daee decided that § 3-2A-02(c)
applies to an expert witness's qualifications when proffered to the
court, but does not apply to the sufficiency of the expert's testimony
once admitted. 137 The court proposed a framework that could give
some effect to the same or similar communities language, but gave
little rationale for doing SO.138 The court also provided no guidance
as to how an expert's familiarity with the defendant's community will
be analyzed when the expert's qualifications are challenged. The

13l.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

ld. at 15.
ld. at 16.
ld. at 17 n.12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Jd. at 17. Appellees, in hannony with the Amicus Curiae, argued that such a
requirement elevates form over substance. Brief of Appellee at 22-23, Daee v. Lucas,
No. 2485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15, 20 11); Brief of Maryland Ass'n for Justice as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 8-9, Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011).
137. Daee, No. 2458, slip op. at 15,17-18.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
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Court of Appeals could easily decide not to follow the decision
strictly.
A.

Possible Decisions

1.

Avoid the Statute

There is essentially no legislative history behind the insertion of
section 3-2A-02(c) through the enactment of House Bill 1359.\39 The
Court of Appeals could avoid the same or similar communities
language by finding no clear legislative intent that § 3-2A-02(c)
should supersede Shilkret's national standard of care. This is an
unlikely scenario, as the court will usually give deference to the
legislature's choice to include the particular language. 140
Alternatively, the court could fmd that while the statute adopts the
same or similar communities legal standard in Maryland, Maryland's
statewide medical standard of care is still the national standard. This
is a reasonable path as it recognizes the reality of modem day
medical care-that physicians, most of whom are Board Certified, 141
and hospitals, most of which are nationally accredited, 142 are
practicing medicine according to a national standard of care. Even if
there is a same or similar communities requirement for expert
testimony, any expert familiar with the national standard may testify
because the physicians in every community in Maryland have applied
the national standard of care since the Shilkret decision. Essentially,
because Shilkret imposed a national standard of care in every medical
139. See supra notes 107--08 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
141. See States' Doctors Compared By HealthGrades, HEALTHGRADES (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://www.healthgrades.comlmedialdms/pdflPhysicianComparisonPressReleaselll7
05.pdf. Maryland ranked 15 out of the 50 states and D.C. for percentage of doctors
board certified in their specialty (90.02%). Id. at 2 tbl.l.
142. See Maryland Hospital Peiformance Evaluation Guide: Overview of Maryland
Regulatory System for Hospital Oversight, MD. HEALTH CARE COMM'N, http://
mhcc.maryland.gov/consumerinfo/hospitalguide/patients/other_ infonnationloverview
_oCmarylandJegulatory_systemJor_hospital_oversight.html (last updated Oct. 7,
2010).
The Joint Commission (TJC) approves all acute-care
hospitals. TJC is an independent, not-for-profit group that
evaluates and accredits health care organizations and programs in
the United States ....
Once a hospital has received TJC accreditation ... Maryland
renews the hospital's license. Maryland does not require the
OHCQ to review a hospital that the TJC has accredited ....
Id.
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community across Maryland, the communities cannot now be
differentiated-there is no going back.
2.

Apply the Statute

The court could find that the General Assembly intended to adopt
a same or similar communities standard. It is entirely possible that
the statute only overrules the limited portion of Shilkret that held that
the standard of care is national rather than based on locality. 143 It
could keep intact the holding "that a physician is under a duty to use
that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably
competent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting
in the same or similar circumstances."I44 This explains how the Court
of Appeals could cite both the Shilkret standard and the statutory
language without identifying a conflict: the Shilkret holding can be
applied under a same or similar communities standard. 145 The
rationale for such a decision could mimic that of the Court of Special
Appeals in Daee,146 or it would be appropriate for the court to
examine scholarly writing from both the legal and medical fields to
see what those professionals believe the legislature intended. 147
An example of such persuasive evidence is provided in comment
A.l. under Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 27:1 148 titled,
"Health Care Providers - Standard ofCare.,,149 Section 3-2A-02(c) is
cited and described as "establishing [the] locality rule, overruling
Shilkret in part.,,150 This shows that the lawyers and judges that help
to guide the way Maryland law is practiced, as well as explained by

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Shilkret, 276 Md. 187,200,349 A.2d 245,253 (1975).
Id.
See Dingle v. Belin, 358 Md. 354, 368, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (2000).
See supra Part III.E.2.
See Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525
A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987).
When [the Court] pursue[s] the context of statutory language,
[it is] not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in
the Annotated Code. [It] may and often must consider other
"external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including ...
other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of
legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within
which [it] read[s] the particular language before [it] in a given
case.
Id.
148. Interestingly, this instruction was read to the jury in Daee, but the court did not note
the discussion in comment A.l. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
149. MD. CIVILPJI 27:1 (Md. State Bar Ass'n, Inc. 2009).
150. Id. at cmt. A-I.
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judges to the jury, understand the statute as an adoption of a same or
similar communities standard.
In the Physician's Dilemma article, Maryland was noted as having
a same or similar communities standard, distinct from those states
with a national standard. 151 This indicates that there are at least some
in the medical field who understand the standard of care in Maryland
to follow a same or similar communities rule. It may be useful
information for the courts to know what the majority of health care
providers in Maryland understand the standard of care to be. 152
While these may not be the traditional sources utilized by the
courts to interpret statutory language, at the very least they provide an
interesting reflection. Even if only a minority of those examining the
standard of care understand it to have been changed by § 3-2A-02(c),
this still shows that there is a question that must be answered.

B.

The Court ofAppeals Should Address All Standard of Care
Issues up Front in Order to Avoid the Problems Exemplified by
North Carolina

If the court decides that Maryland has adopted a same or similar
communities standard, the Maryland courts will face the additional
issues foreseen by the Shilkret court when it considered the similar
locality rule in 1975.153 The first issue will be how to define what
makes medical communities similar. The second issue will be how to
determine the degree of community familiarity required for an expert
witness to qualify. The Maryland courts will need to address these
questions sufficiently in order to avoid a chaotic and unfair situation
for plaintiffs who would now have to acquire expert witnesses that
"both conform to the 'same or similar' community standard but still
have sufficient expertise to qualify as experts.,,154
Medical malpractice jurisprudence in Maryland courts must avoid
going the way of the North Carolina courts. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina has stated that its system evidences a desire to
"preserve flexibility in ... proceedings" concerning an expert
witness's familiarity with the same or similar communities in which
the defendant practices. 155 The proverbial three-dollar value of
"flexibility" will give little comfort to plaintiffs who miss out on the
151. Physician's Dilemma, supra note 73.
152. This could provide rationale for the decision that the standard in every Maryland
community is national. See supra Part IV.A.1.
153. See supra Part III.B.2.
154. Loden, supra note 5.
155. Crocker v. Roethling, 675 S.E.2d 625,631 (N.C. 2009).
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compensation they deserve simply because they were given unclear
guidance on how to meet the familiarity requirement.
Maryland's same or similar communities statute is unique from
North Carolina's adoption of that standard in a number of ways.
First, Maryland would be moving, legally, from a national
standard,156 while North Carolina moved directly from a strict locality
rule. 157 Second, the medical communities of Maryland have been
operating under the national standard prior to any change,158 whereas
North Carolina's medical communities never operated under a strictly
national standard. 159 Third, the North Carolina General Assembly
stated its intent in adopting a same or similar communities standard,
which was to avoid a national standard. 160 The Maryland General
Assembly did not state its intention behind the language of § 3-2A02(c), and the statute lacks crucial legislative history. 161 Last, North
Carolina's transition began at common law, so when the North
Carolina General Assembly codified the rule by statute, case law
already existed to guide the courtS. 162 Maryland's case law provides
no guidance outside the national standard of care established In
Shilkret. 163
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has much more room to
interpret § 3-2A-02(c) than did the North Carolina Court with its
same or similar communities statute. This could be a good thing if
the court keeps the pitfalls North Carolina faced in mind, but it could
mean a potentially bigger mess if they do not. Leaving the
familiarity requirements undecided would allow the Court of Appeals
to wait and see how the standards develop in the trial courts, but this
can be a problem where, as in North Carolina, the standard develops
into one that is unclear and arbitrary. 164
For the sake of preserving clarity, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland should acknowledge that the medical standard of care
across Maryland is a national standard by continuing to allow all
physicians familiar with the national standard of care to qualify as
experts. However, if the court chooses to differentiate medical
communities in Maryland, it should do so only prospectively and
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra Part Ill.B.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts III.B, III.D.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107--08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part II.C.2.a.
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provide clear guidelines for establishing an expert's requisite
familiarity with a community and what makes two communities
sufficiently similar.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the national standard of care, which was adopted by
Maryland's highest court in 1975, the expert testimony requirements
are clear. To plunge into unclear waters at the direction of insurance
company lobbyists 165 is unwise and counterproductive. If the
Maryland courts decide to require expert witnesses in medical
malpractice cases be familiar with the same or similar communities in
which the defendant health care provider practices, they must do so
prospectively and establish a clear standard for proving sufficient
familiarity. When compensation for the potentially catastrophic
injuries involved in medical malpractice cases is on the line, the
courts must avoid presenting a deficient, vague standard for the sake
of appearing flexible.
The courts must also consider the effect that the standard of care
will have on Maryland's physicians in their professional decisionmaking.
Fairness and prudence are both important policy
considerations that require Maryland's courts to be crystal clear as
the standard of care requirements are determined. It is critical that
doctors know which standard of care is legally required, not only for
the sake of fair legal liability, but also for the sake of the patients who
receive their care. The most prudent decisions should be encouraged
over substandard community trends.
.
John M Williams Jr. t

165.
t

See Loden, supra note 5.
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, University of Baltimore School of Law. Special thanks to
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process.
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